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Analysis and Detection of Botnets and Encrypted Tunnels

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ABSTRACT

A botnet is a collection of compromised systems. A botnet has a bot-master which identifies the vulnerable systems and compromises them by injecting a malware code and remotely controls all these compromised systems using Command-and-Control Infrastructure. These compromised systems are bots. Thus, a botnet is a network of bots. These bots receive commands from bot-master to perform various malicious activities like Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, phishing, sending spam emails etc. Nowadays, Botnets have become a major threat to online ecosystems. Thus, Analysis and detection of the botnets has become a major research topic in recent years. Nowadays, botnets are relying on anonymous networks to hide their existence. Anonymous communication implies that no one will be able to retrieve the identity of the users in the network. The Tor browser is the most widely used anonymous network among botnets. The Tor aims to eliminate the mapping between user and services or servers by hiding the user's IP address and thereby blocks the user identification and communication tracking. The Tor browser provides anonymity to all of its users. Botnets are now using tor anonymity due to which they hide themselves and it becomes difficult to detect them. The proxy servers are also used to hide the identity of the users. Browsing using Proxy server changes the IP-address of its user due to which backtracking is difficult and it becomes extremely difficult to detect if a chain of proxies is used. This paper aims to identify several ways to reveal the identities of the bots and their bot-master that are using tor or any other anonymous network.

Keywords :— Bot-master, Botnet, Bots, Command-and-Control Infrastructure, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, Tor Network.

I. INTRODUCTION

Botnets are becoming one of the major threats to Internet security. Internet users have been attacked by widespread viruses earlier, but now scenario has changed. Now attackers are no more interested in just infecting large number of computers on the network, in-fact their interest has been shifted to compromising and controlling the infected computers for their personal profits. This new attack brings the concept of Botnets over the global network of computers. The term "Botnet" comprises of two terms "Bot + Net". Bot can also be called as a zombie. A Botnet is a network of computers in which a Bot-master (attacker) compromises vulnerable systems by injecting a malware code and after compromising, these infected systems can be controlled by the Bot-master remotely via commands. Bots can receive commands from Bot-master and perform many cyber-crimes like phishing, DDoS attack etc. The main difference between Botnet and other kind of malwares is the existence of Command-and-Control (C&C) infrastructure. The C&C allows Bots to receive commands and malicious capabilities from Bot-Master. Thus, a network of Bots is formed which is called "Botnet". The Bot-master is a person who controls and manages the whole network of Bots. Types of Botnet based on Architecture-

1. Centralized Botnets: The old approach used by Botnet for their Command and control (C&C) architecture was the centralized mechanism (hierarchical). In this approach, the Bot-master (attacker) distributes the command over the Botnet via various Bot-Controllers in order to hide attacker's real identity. The bot-controller receives the commands from the bot-master and then these bot-controllers distribute the commands to all bots in Botnet.

2. P2P Structured Botnets: This new approach has no C&C server (bot controller) in P2P botnet architecture. The bot-master directly communicates with a peer bot and then the peer bot sends the commands to other bots in the network.

With many countries limiting both freedom of speech and the press, and with privacy concerns being paramount, assuring anonymous Internet communication to provide anonymity and privacy, has become important. But at the same time, anonymity has been leveraged for shadowy activities- such as drug trafficking through Silk Road, publicizing classified information, and planning and coordinating terrorist activities like the November 2015 Paris attack. All this has increased the interest in breaking the anonymized network communication. Surveillance organizations are trying to identify the strength of popular anonymous communication services such as Tor. Anonymous communication implies not being able to identify the originator's IP address and thus his or her location.

Section II covers the literature survey. Section III covers anonymous network- tor, how tor works and OnionBot. Section IV covers how tor provides anonymity to its bot users. Section V covers Results and Section VI covers Conclusion.

II. LITERATURE SURVEY

Botnet is a collection of infected hosts (bots) and is controlled remotely by a bot-master through C&C channel.[1]The bots stay hidden until they are informed by their bot-master to perform an attack. Botnets can perform various malicious activities from DDoS, to spamming, phishing, identity theft. The main difference between Botnet and other kind of malware is the existence of Command-and-Control(C&C) infrastructure. The C&C allows bots to receive commands from bot-master.

According to Cooke et al. [2], the control mechanism of botnet can be classified into centralized and Peer-to-Peer. A centralized one has a central point for bot-master forwarding commands and messages to bots, while its weakness is the single point of failure. But P2P topology overcome this weakness. The centralized mechanism has made them vulnerable to being detected and disabled. The first generation of Botnets utilized the IRC channels as their C&C centres. Thus, new generation of Botnet emerged, Peer to Peer based botnet, which can hide their C&C communication.

[3] This paper has detailed the two architectures of botnet-Centralized and Peer-to-Peer. In centralized approach, the botmaster distributes the command over the botnet via various bot controllers(C&C server) in order to hide attacker's real identity. In Peer-to-Peer, there is no C&C server (or bot controllers). Bot-master directly communicates to a single Bot peer and then that bot spreads the command sent by botmaster to other bots. P2P botnet is not easily manageable, because transferring commands is slow.

[1], [3] Different approaches have been proposed for detection of botnets. These are: Honeypot-based, signature-based, anomaly-based, DNS-based, Mining-based and Networkbased. Honeypot-based detection technique has been considered the most efficient technique among all.

[4] Their proposed framework for detection is based on monitoring network traffics. The architecture of the proposed botnet detection system consists of 4 main components: Filtering, Application Classifier, Traffic monitoring, malicious activity detector. Filtering is responsible to filter out irrelevant traffic flows. This stage reduces the traffic workload. Application classifier is responsible for separating IRC and HTTP traffics from rest of traffics. Malicious activity detector is responsible to analyse the traffics carefully and try to detect malicious activities. Traffic monitoring detect the group of hosts that have similar behaviour and communication pattern. [5] The main contribution of this paper is that Peershark works on the detailed evaluation of conversation-based approach which is clearly advantageous over traditional flowbased approaches. PeerShark correctly categorize different types of P2P applications-whether malicious or benign-with good accuracy. But the accuracy obtained with classification of benign P2P applications is relatively lower as compared to

accuracy of detection of P2P botnet. Being flow-oblivious (i.e. port and protocol oblivious), many lower-level details (transport layer protocol) are neglected.

[6] Their approach was to detect IRC-based botnet. This approach observes the IRC traffic within an organization network domain and identifies infected hosts and IRC server. From observing the real traffic, they observed that bot-master uses IRC channels to control his botnet and traffic is not encrypted. Their proposed IRC-based botnet detection system can detect not only infected hosts but also C&C servers.

[7] This paper focusses on how botnets are constantly searching for new ways to evade detection. To mitigate botnets, we have to detect the nodes (bots) themselves. Once found, we can hijack and shut down their command and control servers through a number of different methods. Tor is excellent at maintaining the anonymous identity of the sender. Each node only knows where it should send the data next, so it's impossible to track its chain to the original sender. There is a real chance that Tor-based botnet would be very tough to mitigate in the near future.

[8]This paper has investigated on how anonymous is the tor network. The Tor network reroute the traffic through several nodes: an entry node, which sends the traffic to the relay node, then relay node sends it to the exit node. Then from the exit node, it is transferred to the final destination. While sending data through Tor, the client encrypts it multiple times with the node's keys, including predecessor's and successor's IPaddresses. Each node has the key only for one layer, uses the key to remove that layer, and then forwards the data. In this way, it sees only the IP addresses of nodes from where the packet has come and where it has to go. The exit node sends the packet to its final destination, which only sees exit node's IP-address.

[9] This paper has presented different anonymity technologies that enable Internet users to maintain a level of privacy. They have covered anonymity technologies including proxy servers, remailers, JAP (Java Anon Proxy), I2P (Invisible Internet Project), and Tor with the geo-location of deployed servers. Among these systems, proxy servers, Tor and I2P are actively used, while remailers and JAP have minimal usage

[10] This paper has presented two contributions to break Tor anonymity, a Data Mining driven solution to recover the browsing history of Tor users and optimal configuration settings based on game theory for Tor users and operators, as well taking malicious nodes into account. They have used a malware "Torinj" that is targeted against Tor exit nodes as it is expected that exit nodes are large in number and as well as more vulnerable and less protected than entry nodes. The "Torinj" has the ability to recover a user browsing history even when a trusted entry node is used. [11] This paper has introduced the illusion of privacy of botnets over Tor. This paper showed that P2P botnets using Tor are still vulnerable to the same kind of attacks such as crawling and centralized botnets are vulnerable to the vulnerability of tor itself. The bots using Tor network are detectable due to the network traffic characteristics and the ports used by them. Centralized C&C servers also attract a lot of communication from all their bots. This behaviour exposes the botnet and this anomaly is not difficult to identify in the network.

[12] This paper has introduced a novel system called 'TorWard for the study and the identification of malicious traffic over Tor. An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) was used to analyse the traffic flowing. Malicious traffic over Tor includes P2P traffic, malware traffic (like worms, viruses, bots), Denial of service attack traffic, spam traffic and many other. The paper showed around 10% of tor traffic triggered IDS alerts.

[13] In this paper, potential attacks on the anonymity networks that can compromise user identities and communication links have been discussed. They have also summarized protection mechanisms against such attacks. It states that while using Tor, a user can browse the web without leaving a trace of his/her IP address in the logs of any web servers. They have surveyed the de-anonymization approaches so that it is easy to understand vulnerabilities in the anonymity networks.

[14]This paper present the techniques that exploit the Tor exit policy to greatly simplify the traffic analysis. The fundamental vulnerability exposed by this paper is not specific to Tor browser but rather to the problem of anonymous web browsing itself. There are two security problems that this paper exploits: HTTP's vulnerability to man-in-the-middle attacks and web browser's code execution feature. Thus Tor may actually decrease the anonymity of users by making them vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. The web browsers execute malicious code which allows for arbitrary communication back to HTTP server and this pattern can be can be detected by an external observer using traffic analysis. Thus, the Tor creates a tunnel, and then anyone can access the restricted web content. This is the genuine problem and one can't mitigate this.

III. ANONYMOUS NETWORK

A. Tor

In the Tor network (Tor's original name, The Onion Router), the traffic has to be rerouted through several nodes: an entry node, relay node and an exit node. Entry node sends the traffic to relay node, which sends it to the exit node. The tor traffic is encrypted. The source's identity is anonymous because the destination can see only the exit node's IP address. Tor randomly selects exit nodes to prevent any traffic analysis attack. Tor has to minimize the communication latency to avoid any degradation in performance and selection of exit node is also not equally random and thus does not produce uniformity in distribution of exit nodes. Thus, the exit nodes actually used might be more heavily concentrated in a particular area or to a particular ISP. Various investigative results shows significant imbalance between number of available exit nodes and those actually used. Moreover, most of the exit nodes are concentrated in a particular ISP or a particular small area. Consequently, the effects of exitnode distribution and their selection could erode network security and anonymity.

B. How Tor Works

- *1.* Tor aims to eliminate the mapping between user and servers by hiding the user's IP address and thus prevents user identification and communication tracking.
- 2. To accomplish this, Tor has to generate an overlay network in which each node (entry, relay, and exit) maintains Transport Layer Security (TLS) connection to every other node. Thus, Tor traffic is encrypted with TLS. Tor has to establish a "circuit"- a random path through the network by selecting entry, relay and exit nodes.
- **3.** Tor can extend this "circuit" by adding more relay nodes to it, but generally a circuit has only one relay node so that the communication latency is at acceptable level.
- **4.** To select an exit node, Tor uses weighted random selection: It traverses the entire connection from source to the destination and in order to maximize the number of pending exit streams and considering the exit node's capacity and uptime as selection parameters, it selects the exit node.
- **5.** To avoid delays, Tor builds "circuits" pre-emptively and regularly within every 30 seconds.
- 6. When data is sent through Tor, it is encrypted multiple times with node's keys, including the predecessor's and successor's addresses for each node.
- 7. Each node has the key only to decrypt the data for one layer. Each node uses that key to remove that layer and then forwards the data to the next node in path. In this way, one node can see only the IP address of where the packet came from and where it has to go.
- 8. The exit node sends the packet to the final destination, thus the destination only sees the IP address of the exit node. When reply returns from the destination, each node add its encryption layer and then only the sender can finally remove them all and thus read the reply that came from the destination.
- **9.** Each circuit formed is used for 10 minutes and is not rotated after each access, an exit node's IP address could

be recorded multiple times and the same exit node might get selected repeatedly.

10. Exit node selection is weighted to favour the nodes with higher data rate and capacity, thus, it is natural to assume that a country's Internet data rate would heavily influence its exit node's use.

C. OnionBot, a Botnet utilizing Tor

OnionBot is a peer-to-peer botnet that relies on Tor network for the communication among nodes. No bot knows the IP address of any other bot. To communicate with each other, they only know the onion address of the bot to which the message has to be sent. Therefore, tracking the bot chain is actually impossible.

Onion Bot operates in 4 stages:

1) Infection: It is the phase where vulnerable users are infected through phishing spams, drive-by-download, zero day vulnerability, remote exploitation etc.

2) Rally: Once a computer is infected, it enters into the rally stage in which the infected computer, which is now a bot, will look for other bots in the network. To do this, this bot bootstraps into the network with the help of a hardcoded peer list of onion addresses, which are periodically updated.

3) Waiting: After connecting to the OnionBot network, this bot enters into the waiting stage where it is ready to receive commands from the bot-master.

4) Execution: After receiving commands from bot-master and identifying the target, it enters the execution phase, where it sends out spams or perform DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attacks etc.

5) Especially with users already using Tor to enhance their privacy, OnionBot, which operates within Tor, can have the potential to easily infect the other connected Tor users.

IV. HOW TOR PROVIDES ANONYMITY TO ITS BOT USERS

A. Using Sniffers

Sniffers are used to capture the packets over the network. The idea here is to browse any link (say, "whatis myipaddress.com") and analyze the destination IP-address. It should match with IP-address of "whatismyipaddress.com".

1. Browsing with any normal browser: In destination address, it shows the IP-address of "whatismyipaddress.com".

Apply a display filter _ <	08-/>				Epression
Tre	Source	Destnation	Protocol	Length Info	
459 18.218289	192.168.0.105	192.241.178.214	TCP	61 50623+6851 [PSH, ACK] Seq=276 Ack=262 kin=63194 Len=7	
460 10.230200	192.168.0.106	184.188.237.186	TCP	54 56362+80 [ACK] Seq=477 Ack=4312 Win=64264 Len=0	-
461 18.386788	184.188.237.185	192.168.0.106	TCP	1502 [TCP segment of a reassembled POU]	
462 10.307554	184.188.237.186	192.168.0.106	TCP	1514 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]	
463 10.307601	192.168.0.106	104.108.237.106	TCP	54 56362+80 [ACK] Seq=477 Ack=7220 klin+65700 Len=0	
454 10.308209	192.168.0.106	184,244,42,72	TCP	54 56366+443 [ACK] Seq+644 Ack+3813 Win+64688 Len+0	
465 18.389139	184,188,237,186	192.168.0.106	TCP	1490 [TCP segment of a reassembled POU]	
465 10.311239	184.188.237.186	192.168.0.105	TCP	1514 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]	
467 10.311299	192.168.0.106	184.188.237.186	TCP	54 56362+80 [ACK] Seg=477 Ack=10116 Win=65700 Len=0	
468 10.313496	104.108.237.106	192.168.0.106	HTTP	1115 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)	-
469 10.328222	192.168.0.106	184.244.42.72	TCP	54 56368+443 [ACK] Seq+644 Ack+3813 Win+64688 Len+0	
470 10.338221	192.168.0.105	184.244.42.72	TCP	54 56367-443 [ACK] Seq+644 Ack+3813 Win+64688 Len+8	-
471 10.477347	192.241.178.214	192.168.0.106	TCP	68 6851+58623 [ACK] Seq+262 Ack+283 Win=68832 Len+8	
472 10.496281	192.168.0.106	182.161.72.100	TCP	66 56389+88 [SYN] Seq=8 Win=8192 Len=8 MSS=1468 WS=4 SACK_PERM=1	
473 10.516180	192.168.0.105	104,108,237,106	TCP	54 56362+80 [ACK] Seq=477 Ack=11177 Win=64636 Len=0	
474 18.686483	182.161.72.100	192.168.0.106	TCP	62 88+56389 [SYN, ACK] Seq+8 Ack+1 Win+4388 Len+8 MSS=1468 SACK_PERM+1	-
475 18.686535	192.168.0.105	182,161,72,100	TCP	54 56389+08 [ACK] Seq+1 Ack+1 kin+64248 Len+8	
476 18.687436	192.168.0.105	182.161.72.100	TCP	2974 [TCP segment of a reassembled POU]	
477 10,544449	192,168,8,185	716.58.199.122	TCP	54 56358-443 [FTH, APR] Sena383 Arka7348 Winu54890 Lenut	
Internet Protocol	Version 4, Src: 192. rol Protocol, Src Por	168.0.106, Dst: 104.1 t: 56362, Dst Port: 0 30 00 00 45 00T.	188.237.100	7, kk: 1015, Lex: 0 .E.	
00 b0 c5 54 da f3 10 00 28 1d 6f 46			.Pk14		

Fig. 1 Sniffer captures the packet while normal browsing.

2. Browsing with Tor browser: For the same request, it shows some other IP-address (other than that of "whatismyipaddress.com"). It can be the IP-address of tor-browser.

http				🛛 🛄 🔹 Epresion
Tine	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length Brfa
8 2.567556	81.161.59.93	192.168.0.106	HTTP	333 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/json)
9 2.569134	192.168.0.106	81.161.59.93	HTTP	149 GET /poll?push id=292aba41-aac3-4585-6665-ed233776ef46 HTTP/1.1
10 2.569645	192.168.0.106	81.161.59.93	HTTP	149 GET /poll?push_id=292aba41-aac3-4585-6665-ed233776ef4b HTTP/1.1
104 8.826731	192.168.0.106	107.22.215.247	HTTP	165 GET / HTTP/1.1
111 9.119588	107.22.215.247	192.168.0.106	HTTP	192 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
233 12.305939	192.168.0.105	54.239.32.8	HTTP	433 GET /gp/au/d/88889HDIXU/ref=s9_al_aubu_g23_i2_HTTP/1.1
277 12.689584	54.239.32.8	192.168.0.105	HTTP	357 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
502 15.016859	81.161.59.90	192.168.0.106	HTTP	333 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/json)
503 15.017532	192.168.0.106	81.161.59.98	HTTP	149 GET /poll?push_id=282d4978-lee1-4869-b751-6c1954c1ddf3 HTTP/1.1
1530 21.549929	192.168.0.106	54.235.71.200	HTTP	165 GET / HTTP/1.1
1545 21.839298	54.235.71.200	192.168.0.106	HTTP	192 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
1565 22.398267	192.168.0.105	54.239.32.8	HTTP	410 GET /gp/aw/d/8000HT2x1/ref=s9_al_awbw_g23_i2 HTTP/1.1
1578 22.561393	54.239.32.8	192.168.0.106	HTTP	1007 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
1582 22.578218	192.168.0.106	54.239.32.8	HTTP	400 GET /gp/mu/d/800L2PLACE/ref=s9_al_muburg23_12 HTTP/1.1
1615 22.849120	192.168.0.106	54.235.71.200	HTTP	165 GET / HTTP/1.1
1619 22.957646	54.239.32.8	192.168.0.106	HTTP	1226 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/btml)
1632 23,137972	54.235.71.200	192.168.0.106	HTTP	192 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
1759 24.561956	81.161.59.93	192.168.0.106	HTTP	333 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/json)
1768 24, 562618	192,168,8,185	81,161,59,93	HTTP	149 GFT /moll?nuch iduhidda=5f4-aa52-4r19-811a-a6d28r431877 HTTP/1.1
			st: D-LinkI	ts) on interface 0 d&rf3ice (00:c5:54:da:f3:ce)
Ethernet II, Src: Internet Protocol Transmission Cont	Version 4, Src: 192 rol Protocol, Src Po	.168.0.106, Dst: 107. rt: 57105, Dst Port:		Ack: 1, Les: 111
Ethernet II, Src: Internet Protocol Transmission Cont Hypertext Transfe 00 b0 c5 54 da f: 110 00 97 2c 2f 4	Version 4, Src: 192 ral Protocal, Src Po r Protocal 3 ce fc aa 14 1b 6c 0 00 00 06 60 00 c8	rt: 57105, Dst Port: 30 08 00 45 00T a8 00 6a 6b 16,	80, Seq: 1, 	.f. je
Ethernet II, Src: Internet Protocol Transmission Cont Hypertext Transfe	Version 4, Src: 192 rol Protocol, Src Po r Protocol 3 ce fc aa 14 1b 6c 0 00 00 06 60 00 c0 0 50 b6 51 4f a7 72	rt: 57185, Dst Port: 30 80 80 45 80T a8 80 6a 6b 16, e5 4a db 50 18	80, Seq: 1, 	б. ўс. д.
Ethernet II, Src: Internet Protocol Transmission Cont hypertext Transfe 00 b0 c5 54 da f 10 60 97 2c 2f 4 10 d7 f7 df 11 0 15 fa f0 04 ao 0	Version 4, Src: 192 rol Protocol, Src Po r Protocol 3 ce fc aa 14 1b 6c 0 00 50 66 60 00 c0 0 50 b5 51 4f a7 72 0 00 47 45 54 20 2f	rt: 57185, Dot Port: 38 88 88 45 88 a8 88 68 65 15 e6 4a 65 58 18 28 48 54 54 59	80, Seq: 1, 	.6. js. j.
Ethernet II, Src: Internet Protocol Transmission Cont Hypertext Transfe 00 b0 c5 54 da f 120 d7 f7 df 11 0 20 d7 f7 df 11 0 31 fa f0 04 aa 0 40 2f 31 2e 31 0	Version 4, Src: 192 rol Protocol, Src Po r Protocol 3 ce fc as 14 1b 6c 0 00 00 66 00 00 00 5 00 51 4f a7 72 0 00 47 45 54 20 2f d 0s 48 6f 73 74 3s	rt: 57185, Dst Port: 30 00 00 45 00T a8 00 68 65 15, e6 4a d5 50 18 20 43 54 54 50 20 63 68 65 63 /l.	80, Seq: 1, 	.5. 76. 78. 79.
Ethernet II, Src: Internet Protocol Transmission Cont Hypertext Transfe 00 b0 c5 54 da f 100 b0 c5 54 da f 100 b0 c7 27 df 11 0 100 fa f0 44 ao 0 27 31 b 31 b 31 b 55 65 69 70 2e 6	Version 4, Src: 192 rol Protocol, Src Po r Protocol 3 ce fc aa 14 1b 6c 0 00 00 06 60 00 c0 0 90 b5 51 4f a7 72 0 00 47 45 54 20 2f 0 40 48 46 6f 73 74 3a 1 6d 61 7a 6f 6e 61	rt: 57185, Dst Port: 30 00 00 45 00T a8 00 68 65 15, e6 4a d5 59 18 20 43 54 54 50 20 63 68 65 63 ./L. 77 73 2e 63 6f kip	80, Seq: 1, 	б. је, , , тр тр те ес со
Ethernet II, Src: Internet Protocol Transmission Cont Hypertext Transfe 00 b0 c5 54 ds f 10 00 97 2c 2f 4 10 d7 f7 df 11 0 13 fa f0 04 as 0 14 fa f0 04 as 0 16 65 67 02 2 6 16 66 68 70 22 6	Version 4, Src: 192 rol Protocol, Src Po r Protocol 3 ce fc aa 14 15 6c 0 00 00 66 00 00 c0 0 50 56 51 4f a7 72 0 00 47 45 54 30 27 4 0a 44 6f 73 74 4 0a 45 6f ae f1 3 63 65 70 74 2d 45	rt: 57185, Dst Port: 30 00 00 45 00T a8 00 68 65 15, e6 4a d5 50 18 20 43 54 54 50 20 63 68 65 63 /l.	88, Seq: 1, 	.f. 76. 78. 79. 719 706 706 706 700 700 700 700 700 700 700
Ethernet II, Src: Internet Protocol Transmission Cont Hypertext Transfe 000 b8 c5 54 da f 000 b7 12 c7 4 000 d7 f7 df 11 0 f a f0 84 aa 0 650 d6 69 70 2c 6 650 66 69 70 2c 6 650 66 60 d6 a4 15 666 66 d6 a4 15 666 70 2c 6	Version 4, Src: 192 rol Protocol, Src Po r Protocol 3 ce fc aa 14 15 6c 0 80 80 86 60 80 60 0 80 85 14 fa 7 72 0 80 47 45 54 20 27 0 80 47 45 54 20 27 0 80 47 45 57 47 43 1 60 61 7a 67 70 74 34 7 7a 65 70 60 8a 43	rt: 57185, Dat Port: 30 00 00 45 00 a8 00 66 65 16 20 48 54 54 50 20 48 54 54 50 20 63 66 65 3 /l. 77 73 22 68 65 63	88, Seq: 1, 	.б. јр. ,Р. 1717 Мес 400 601 602 602 602 602

Fig. 2 Sniffer captures the packet while tor browsing.

B. Using Operating System Utilities

"Netstat" utility can also capture the destination IPaddresses while browsing, it also captures the packet details. 1. Result of netstat while normal browsing: It includes the IP-address of "whatismyipaddress.com" in the destination.




Fig.3 IP-address of "whatismyipaddress.com".

C'oWin	dows/upstern32/omd/exe			and the second	*
TCP	192.168.0.106:52229	192.241.154.61:6851	ESTABLISHED		-
TCP	192.168.8.186:52231	18.248.254.124:55515	ESTABLISHED		
TCP	192.168.8.186:52236	198.211.181.78:6851	ESTABLISHED		
TCP	192.168.8.186:52248	ban87a81-in-f3:https	TIME_Well		
TCP	192.168.0.106:52241	bon@7s81-in-f3:https	TIME MAIT		
TCP	192.168.8.186:52242	bom87s81-in-f3:https	TIME_WAIT		
TCP	192.168.0.106:52243	bom@7s@1-in-f3:https	TIME WAIT		
TCP	192.168.8.186:52244	hom87081-in-f3:https	TIME_WRIT		
TCP	192.168.8.186:52245	bom@7s81-in-f3:https	TIME MAIL		
TCP	192.168.8.186:52246	sc-in-f188:5228	ESTABLISHED		
TCP	192.168.0.106:52247	bon@7s81-in-f14thttps	ESTABLISHED		
TCP	192,168.8.186:52248	sc-in-f95:https	ESTABLISHED		
TCP	192.168.8.186:52249	sc-in-f95:https	CLOSE WAIT		
TCP	192.168.0.186:52251	ec2-52-28-162-68:http	ESTABLISHED		
TCP	192.168.0.106:52252	maa@3s19-in-f118:https	ESTABLISHED		
TCP	192.168.8.186:52254	bon@Ss@8-in-f174:https	TIME_WAIT		
TCP	192,168.8.186:52268	104.27.281.91:https	ESTABLISHED		
TCP	192.168.8.186:52265	bom87o81-in-f132:https	TIME WRIT		
TCP	192.168.8.186:52271	bom87s81-in-f3:https	ESTABLISHED		
TCP	192.168.8.186:52272	bon@7c81-in-f3:https	ESTABLISHED		
TCP	192.168.0.106:52273	reverse-unsetlhttp	ESTABLISHED		
TCP	192.168.8.186:52283	211.34.19.189:54135	SYN SENT		
TCP	192.168.0.186:52288	c8:6886	SYN SENT		
TCP	192.168.8.186:52293	45.55.285.187:6851	ESTABLISHED		
TCP	192.168.8.186:52295	108-174-10-10:http:	ESTABLISHED		
TCP	192.168.8.186:52383	ec2-187-28-197-36:http	ESTABLISHED		
TCP	192.168.8.186:52388	a184-188-237-186:http	ESTABLISHED		
TCP	192.168.8.186:52389	a104-108-237-106:http	ESTABLISHED		
TCP	192,168,8,186:52311	ec2-52-28-162-68:https	ESTABLISHED		
TCP	192.168.0.106:52313	a184-188-237-186:https	ESTABLISHED		
TCP	192,168.0.106:52314	a184-188-237-186 thttps	ESTABLISHED		
TCP	192.168.8.186:52318	184.24.5.71:https	ESTABLISHED		
TCP	192,168,8,186:52319	184.24.5.71:http:	ESTABLISHED		
TCP	192.168.8.186:52328	a184-188-237-186:https	ESTABLISHED		
TCP	192.168.0.106:52321	hon85:88-in-f174:http:	ESTABLISHED		
TCP	192.168.8.186:52322	a184-188-237-186:https	ESTABLISHED		
TCP	192,168,8,186:52323	a184-188-237-186:http:	ESTABLISHED		
TCP	192.168.8.186:52324	a184-188-237-186:http:	ESTABLISHED		
TCP	192,168,8,186:52325	a184-188-237-186:http:	ESTABLISHED		
TCP	192.168.0.106:52326	a184-188-237-186:https	ESTABLISHED		
TCP	192.168.0.106:52325	182.161.72.188:https	SYN SENT		1.0
TCP	192,168,0,106:52328	xx-fbcdn-shw-81-hks3:h			1.52
TCP	[::]:135	PeStanDa:8	LISTENING		
TCP	[:::1:445	PcStanDa:0	LISTENING		
TCP	[:::1:554	PeStanDate	LISTENING		
TCP	[::]:1521		LISTENING		
TCP	(::):2869	PcStanDa:8	LISTENING		
TCP	[::]:3386	PeStanDa:0 PeStanDa:0	LISTENING		
TCP	[::]:3587 [::]:5357	PcStanDa:0 PcStanDa:0	LISTENING		
TCP					
TCP	[::]:8888	PcStanDa:8	LISTENING		
TCP	[::]:18243	PcStanDa:0	LISTENING		
TCP	[::]:48187	PeStanDa:8	LISTENING		
TCP	[::]:49166	PcStanDa:0	LISTENING		
TCP	E::1:49167	PcStanDa:8	LISTENING		
TCP	[::]:49178	PeStanDa:0	LISTENING		
TCP	£::1:49193	PcStanDa:8	LISTENING		

Fig. 4 Netstat captures addresses while normal browsing.

2. Result of netstat while tor browsing: In the destination there is no IP-address of whatismyipaddress.com.




Fig. 5 Netstat captures addresses while tor browsing. The system is communicating to tor and then tor is communicating to whatismyipaddress.com, thus, whatsimyipaddress.com shows IP-address of tor instead of the system. The destination part might be the IP-address of tor but that can never be the IP-address of "whatismyipaddress.com".

C. Using Man-in-the-Middle Utility

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Fig. 6 It captures IP-address.

V. RESULTS

Thus, the survey involving sniffers, operating system utilities and man-in-the-middle utility proves that tor network actually hides the IP address of the source node. It eliminates the mapping between source and destination. The Tor network reroute the traffic through several nodes: an entry node, which sends the traffic to the relay node, then relay node sends it to the exit node. Then from the exit node, it is transferred to the final destination. While sending data through Tor, the client encrypts it multiple times with the node's keys, including predecessor's and successor's IP-addresses. Each node has the key only for one layer, uses the key to remove that layer, and then forwards the data. In this way, it sees only the IPaddresses of nodes from where the packet has come and where it has to go. The exit node sends the packet to its final destination, which only sees exit node's IP-address. Backtracking to the source node is a little difficult. But, at the same time the tor network is still vulnerable. Various efforts have already been made to break its anonymity.

Туре	Identify Anonymity?
Sniffers	Yes
OS Utility	Yes
Man-in-the-middle Utility	Yes

Table1: All types used to identify anonymity.

Туре	Expected Destination IP- Address	Actual Destination IP- Address
Sniffers	104.108.237.106	104.108.237.106
OS Utility	104.108.237.106	104.108.237.106
Man-in-the- middle Utility	104.108.237.106	104.108.237.106

Table2: It shows that while normal browsing expected and actual destination IP-address values match.

Туре	Expected Destination IP- Address	Actual Destination IP- Address
Sniffers	104.108.237.106	107.22.215.247
OS Utility	104.108.237.106	162.243.146.215
Man-in-the-	104.108.237.106	212.159.174.32
middle Utility		

Table3: It shows that while tor browsing expected and actual destination IP-address values do not match.

VI. CONCLUSION

Thus, the Tor creates a tunnel, and then anyone can access the restricted web content. This is the genuine problem and one can't mitigate this. Even various network security appliances provider like "CyberRoam", Cisco and Juniper are also threatened with the power of Tor browsing and till now have not been able to break the Tor power. But at the same time, P2P botnets using Tor are still vulnerable to the same kind of attacks such as crawling and centralised botnets are vulnerable to the vulnerability of tor itself. The bots using Tor network are detectable due to the network traffic characteristics and the ports used by them. Centralized C&C servers also attract a lot of communication from all their bots. This behaviour exposes the botnet and this anomaly is not difficult to identify in the network. The "Torinj" has the ability to recover a user

browsing history even when a trusted entry node is used. Similarly with this, it has been found that there are many other parameters like IP address, geographical location, number of hops in the path to identify the communication path and the source node.

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